Assessing the Effectiveness of Ukraine’s Anti-Russia Operations in Africa

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which began in Ukraine, has expanded beyond its original geographical boundaries. Initially, the expectation was that any wider confrontation would primarily affect European countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe. Yet thousands of kilometres away, the effects of the war are being felt across Africa, where Ukraine is seeking to undermine Russia’s influence and its ability to support the war.

Through its security and intelligence services, Ukraine has established an operational footprint across parts of the continent to counter Moscow’s activities and the resources that sustain its military campaign in Ukraine. The strategy seeks to weaken Russia’s global position, disrupt illicit financial flows that support its domestic military-industrial complex, and impose costs on Russian forces operating across Africa. It combines direct kinetic operations with intelligence support, technological transfers, including drone capabilities, and partnerships with local armed groups in theatres where Russian forces are present, including Sudan, Mali and Libya.

These efforts have been underway for roughly two years. This therefore, raises two questions: how effective have Ukraine’s operations been in reducing Russian influence across Africa? And what long-term strategic risks could these activities create for Ukraine, particularly for its post-conflict engagement with the continent?

Ukraine’s Counter-Russia Operations Across Africa

Ukraine’s efforts to counter Russian influence have focused primarily on the Sahel, Sudan and Libya. Russia has developed a substantial presence in these areas, using security partnerships to strengthen its political and diplomatic position while gaining access to economic resources. In some cases, these arrangements have also provided financial benefits and logistical support that contribute to Russia’s wider strategic objectives.

Sudan marked one of the first major theatres for Ukrainian intelligence operations in Africa. The outbreak of war in April 2023 created an opportunity for Kyiv to establish a presence in the country and counter Russian support for the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Russia’s Wagner Group, which later came under the broader structure of the Africa Corps, had maintained a presence in Sudan since 2017. Its relationship with the RSF included involvement in lucrative gold extraction and trading networks, which offered Moscow a means of generating revenue and reducing its exposure to international sanctions.

Ukraine’s initial involvement reportedly included an operation to secure General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s evacuation from Khartoum to Port Sudan, which remained under army control. Burhan and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy later met in Ireland. The meeting was widely viewed as an important step towards closer strategic cooperation, potentially involving Ukrainian tactical support in exchange for Sudanese arms transfers and diplomatic backing. It also provided Kyiv with an opportunity to disrupt the relationship between the RSF and Russia.

Following the meeting, Ukrainian operatives reportedly conducted operations against RSF convoys supported by Russian personnel. These included night-time ambushes, the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and precision strikes using first-person-view (FPV) drones against logistics columns. The reported targets included transport networks supporting RSF operations and Russian personnel involved in training or supervising RSF fighters. Some accounts also reported the capture of Wagner operatives.

Ukraine’s intervention may have contributed to the pressure on Russian-backed elements operating alongside the RSF, although its precise contribution to developments on the battlefield remains difficult to establish. The Sudanese Armed Forces subsequently made gains in Omdurman and secured important positions around the Nile. However, these advances cannot be attributed to Ukrainian support alone. Ukraine’s operations may also have contributed to the RSF’s shift towards other external partners, including the United Arab Emirates, although the extent of this influence remains unclear.

In the Sahel, Russia’s presence expanded following the wave of military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. As Western military forces withdrew, Russian personnel, initially operating largely through the Wagner Group and later the Africa Corps, became important security partners for the military-led governments. Their activities have included counterterrorism operations, regime protection and the provision of military equipment.

Ukraine’s approach in the Sahel has differed from its reported operations in Sudan. Rather than deploying primarily to conduct direct attacks against Russian-backed forces, Ukrainian personnel have reportedly provided intelligence and tactical support to local armed groups, including Tuareg separatists operating in northern Mali. Reports have described the presence of approximately 15 Ukrainian drone specialists who established contact with the rebel group and provided intelligence analysis, tactical advice and training in the use of commercially available drones and FPV systems adapted for operations in desert environments.

This support reportedly contributed to the Tuareg-led offensive near Tinzaouaten in July 2024, when fighters ambushed a Malian military convoy that included Russian personnel. The fighting resulted in significant casualties among Malian and Russian forces, with several Russian fighters reportedly killed or captured. The episode exposed vulnerabilities in the ability of Russian personnel and their local partners to operate in contested areas of northern Mali.

Reports have also suggested that Ukraine’s activities could develop into a broader regional training effort, extending support to armed groups in other parts of the Sahel. However, the scale and operational scope of any such expansion remain unclear. Ukrainian intelligence and drone support may have contributed to the Tuareg fighters’ ability to challenge Malian government control during the April offensive and capture areas in northern Mali, including Kidal, although the extent of that contribution remains unconfirmed. There are also concerns that these capabilities may have been transferred to Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), following reports of an alliance and operational coordination between the two groups. However, claims of such transfers remain unverified and require independent confirmation.

Libya represents another reported area of Ukrainian activity. Ukrainian uncrewed surface vessel (USV) specialists have reportedly established a presence at a military facility in Misrata. This presence could provide a base for monitoring Russian maritime activity in the Mediterranean and supporting operations against vessels linked to Russia’s so-called shadow fleet. Such vessels have been associated with the movement of Russian oil and the logistical support of Russian facilities abroad, including those in Syria and North Africa.

Reports have also described Ukrainian personnel providing maritime security training and drone instruction to Libyan coastal defence elements. If sustained, this cooperation could give Ukraine a greater presence along the southern Mediterranean and create additional opportunities to monitor Russian military and logistical movements. However, the scale of these activities and their direct effect on Russian operations remain difficult to establish from open source reporting.

How Effective Have the Operations Been?

The results of Ukraine’s efforts to counter Russian influence have been mixed across the different theatres. In the Sahel, the setbacks suffered

by Russian personnel and their Malian partners have raised questions about Russia’s ability to provide the security outcomes promised to military-led governments. Russia initially presented itself as an alternative to Western security partners, offering military assistance without the same political conditions associated with Western engagement. Yet insecurity has continued to worsen across parts of the region, despite the expanded Russian presence.

The battlefield losses suffered by Russian and Malian forces have exposed operational vulnerabilities and challenged the perception that Russian support can decisively reverse the region’s security problems. Ukrainian assistance to local fighters may have contributed to these setbacks, particularly through intelligence support and drone capabilities. However, the wider deterioration in security cannot be attributed to Ukraine’s activities alone. It also reflects the persistence and growing capabilities of armed groups, the limitations of state forces and the difficulty of establishing control across large areas of the Sahel.

In Sudan, the reported Ukrainian intervention may have added pressure on the RSF’s relationship with Russian-linked networks. The RSF has also pursued relationships with other external actors, including the United Arab Emirates. This suggests that Russia’s position within the conflict is not exclusive. However, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that Ukrainian operations were a decisive factor in any reduction in the RSF’s reliance on Russian support. The RSF’s military requirements and its relationships with other external partners are also likely to shape these decisions.

The effects on Russia’s political relationships in the Sahel have been less straightforward. Despite the setbacks suffered by Russian personnel, military-led governments have continued to deepen security cooperation with Moscow. The coordinated attacks by JNIM and the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) in Mali in April 2026, which targeted military positions and senior figures associated with the authorities, created further pressure on the Malian government. Rather than producing a clear break with Russia, the subsequent response appears to have reinforced security cooperation between the two sides. Reports of coordinated action against Ukrainian activities in the region also suggest that Kyiv’s involvement has become a point of concern for Russia and its Sahelian partners.

For Ukraine, operations in Africa have provided an opportunity to demonstrate its experience in drone warfare, intelligence-led operations and the use of relatively inexpensive technology against better-equipped adversaries. These capabilities may attract interest from governments seeking alternatives to established security suppliers. Ukraine’s experience could therefore create opportunities for defence cooperation, particularly in drone technology and related military systems. However, battlefield performance in support of local armed groups does not automatically translate into lasting diplomatic influence or reliable commercial partnerships. The longer-term benefits will depend on how African governments interpret Ukraine’s activities and whether Kyiv can sustain relationships beyond its immediate efforts to counter Russia.

Overall, Ukraine has demonstrated that it can impose costs on Russian personnel and complicate some of Moscow’s activities in Africa. The available evidence is less conclusive on whether these operations have produced a lasting decline in Russian influence or materially weakened Russia’s ability to sustain the war in Ukraine. Russia’s continued security relationships with military-led governments in the Sahel illustrate the limits of measuring success through battlefield losses alone.

Strategic Implications and Long-Term Risks

Ukraine’s strategy may serve its immediate objective of frustrating Russian operations in Africa, disrupting some of the economic and logistical arrangements that support Moscow’s presence, and challenging Russia’s image as a reliable security partner. However, these activities also create longer-term risks for Ukraine and for the security environment in which they take place.

For Ukraine, one risk is that its cooperation with armed groups could damage its standing among African governments. Support for separatist or anti-government forces may be interpreted by affected states as interference in their internal affairs, particularly where those governments maintain close security ties with Russia. This could limit Kyiv’s diplomatic access and complicate efforts to build partnerships with African states after the war. It could also encourage governments to view Ukrainian intelligence and security activities with suspicion, regardless of whether they have direct ties to Moscow.

The consequences may be particularly significant in countries where Russian personnel provide regime protection or support military operations against insurgent groups. Governments in these settings could interpret Ukrainian assistance to their opponents as a threat to their own political survival. That perception may encourage closer cooperation with Moscow or lead to measures intended to restrict Ukraine’s diplomatic and security engagement. The reported response to Ukrainian activities in the Sahel suggests that this risk is already relevant.

There is also a risk associated with transferring advanced military capabilities to non-state armed groups. FPV drones and other commercially available systems can provide relatively inexpensive ways to conduct surveillance and attack targets that would otherwise be difficult to reach. In the hands of local fighters, these capabilities can change the tactical balance against government forces. But the same technology can be adapted by other armed groups for attacks on military positions, security personnel and critical infrastructure.

The longer-term implications depend partly on who receives the technology, how it is used and whether its transfer can be monitored. Capabilities introduced to counter Russian-backed forces may spread beyond their original purpose or reach groups with different objectives. If more capable insurgent organisations acquire these systems, the result could be an increase in the lethality of attacks against state forces and a further erosion of government control in already contested areas.

Ukraine therefore faces a strategic trade-off. Its African operations may disrupt Russian activities in the short term, but the partnerships used to achieve that objective could create diplomatic costs and contribute to the spread of military capabilities among non-state actors. The impact on Ukraine’s position in Africa will depend on whether its immediate operational gains translate into sustained relationships with African governments, rather than leaving Kyiv associated primarily with support for armed groups fighting states that maintain ties with Moscow.